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ST. JOHN'S
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XX NOvEMBER, 1945 NUMBER I
BEWARE OF THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN
L A G financial losses have been sustained recently as a
result of a misunderstanding of the extent and ramifica-
tions of the priority of federal tax claims and liens. Among
the most troublesome problems with respect thereto have
been the following: I
1. The relative priority of federal tax claims which are
not secured by a lien.
2. The relative priority of federal and state tax liens.
3. Whether a federal tax lien, which is unrecorded, has
priority over the recorded lien of a mortgagee who acquired
his mortgage for value, in good faith, and without knowledge
of the tax lien.
I. RELATIVE PRIORITY op FEDERAL TAx CLAIMS
As the United States has not adopted the common law,
whatever right of priority the United States possesses over
other creditors, in the payment of debts, exists because of
some statute which confers it.' It does not exist indepen-
dently of statute.
There are two federal statutes under which the Govern-
ment's tax claims, not secured by a lien, may become entitled
to a priority over the claims of a taxpayer's other creditors,
namely, Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes, and Section
64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938. Although the two
statutes involve the same subject, where one is applicable the
"United States v. Oklahoma, 261 U. S. 253, 67 L. ed. 638 (1923) ; In re
Win. Akers, Jr., Co., Inc., 121 F. (2d) 846 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941).
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other is not.2 Section 64 (a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938,
as amended, applies exclusively where the taxpayer has been
adjudicated a bankrupt. Conversely, the bankruptcy prior-
ity does not affect the status of tax claims in proceedings not
under the Bankruptcy Act, such as in equity receiverships.
The Federal Government's priority in the collection of
its tax claims, not secured by a lien, is derived solely from
these two statutes and, therefore, unless a case comes under
the express coverage of the two statutes, there is no priority
on behalf of the Government.
Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes 3 provides:
Priority established. Whenever any person indebted to the
United States is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased
debtor in the hands of the executors or administrators, is insufficient
to pay all the debts due from the deceased, the debts due to the
United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall
extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient prop-
erty to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in
which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent
debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of
bankruptcy is committed.
A literal reading of the statute, as quoted above, would
appear to indicate that the first portion extends priority
solely upon the insolvency of a taxpayer and that the second
portion, starting after the semi-colon, adds an additional
priority whenever one of the acts specified therein is com-
mitted. However, the courts have not followed this literal
'interpretation. In United States v. Oklahoma,4 the Supreme
Court stated:
Mere inability of the debtor to pay all his debts in ordinary
course of business is not insolvency within the meaning of the act,
but it must be manifested in one of the modes pointed out in the
latter part of the statute which defines or explains the meaning of
insolvency referred to in the earlier part.
On the basis of the court's decision, no priority attaches
in favor of the Government's tax claim unless there exists
2 f, re Jacobson, 263 Fed. 883 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920).
331 U. S. C. A. § 191.
4261 U. S. 253, 43 Sup. Ct. 295, 67 L. ed. 638 (1923).
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an inability of the taxpayer to pay his debts with all his
property, plus one of the "manifestations" of insolvency
stated in the statute, viz., (1) a voluntary assignment of
assets, (2) an attachment by process of law of the estate and
effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent debtor, or
(3) commission of an act of bankruptcy.5
A marked distinction is made, however, between living
and deceased debtors. In the case of a deceased debtor, the
"manifestations" of insolvency discussed above, are not re-
quired; the section expressly provides that the United States
shall have priority whenever the estate in the hands of the
executor or administrator "is insufficient to pay all the debts
due to the United States." 6
Interpretations by the courts 7 have now clearly estab-
lished the following rules with respect to Section 3466:
1. This section does not give the United States a lien
upon its debtor's property, but only a right to priority of
payment out of the same in certain cases.8
2. The priority established can never attach while the
debtor continues the owner and in possession of the prop-
erty, though he may be unable to pay all his debts.
3. No evidence can be received of the insolvency of a
living debtor until he has been divested of his property in
one of the modes stated.
4. Whenever the debtor is thus divested of his prop-
erty, the person who becomes invested with the title is there-
by made a trustee for the United States, and is bound to pay
the debt first out of the proceeds of the debtor's property.
Since the priority established by Section 3466 does not
amount to a lien, a valid mortgage which has been executed
GDavis v. Miller-Link Lumber Co., 296 Fed. 649 (C. C. A. Tex. 1924).
6 Equitable Trust Co. v. Connecticut Brass, etc., Corp., 290 Fed. 712
(C. C. A. Conn. 1923).
7 Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 12 Pet. 102, 132, 9 L. ed. 1017 (Md. 1838);
In re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co., 294 Fed. 921 (D. C. Md. 1923), rev'd on
other grounds, 5 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 1925).8 United States v. Eggleston, Fed. Cas. No. 15,027 (C. C. Or. 1877) ; Same
v. Griswold, 8 Fed. 496 (C. C. Or. 1881).
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by a taxpayer before his insolvency, and recorded by the
mortgagee, is superior to the priority granted the Govern-
ment. Moreover, regardless of the existence of the mortgage,
the mortgaged property becomes an asset out of which claims
against the debtor may be paid, only to the extent of the
debtor's equity of redemption therein, if any.
The position of the Government's priority with respect
to the lien of such mortgages is stated in North River Coal
and Wharf Co. v. McWilliams Bros.9 as follows:
The Supreme Court appears to have given priority to the gov-
ernment under section 3466 . . . in all cases except where the legal
title of the taxpayer has been in some measure divested before the
tax or other indebtedness became due.
As previously mentioned, the second of the two statutes
conferring priority on claims of the Federal Government,
namely, Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ap-
plies only when the taxpayer has been adjudicated a bank-
rupt. The Act states that "all taxes legally due and owing
by the bankrupt to the United States, State, county, district,
or municipality" 10 shall have priority, except with respect
to certain necessary expenses of administration of the de-
ceased's estate.
An examination of this provision reveals that Section
64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act embraces all taxes owing by
the bankrupt, and makes no mention of the relative priority
of federal taxes as compared with state and local taxes.
Since the Federal Government has the power to accord itself
such priority, as it has done in the case of Section 3466 of
the Revised Statutes, the absence of such provision is sig-
nificant. In view of its omission, Section 64(a) lends itself
to the construction that no such priority was intended; that
all taxing bodies are to share on a pro rata basis. This con-
struction was placed upon it by the court in In re Maryland
Coal Co. of West Virginia,1 where claims filed by the United
States, State of West Virginia, and the sheriff of Taylor
9 59 F. (2d) 979, 981 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932), aff'd sub. noan., New York v.
Maclay, 288 U. S. 290 (1933).
10 10 U. S. C. A. § 104.
1136 F. Supp. 142 (1941).
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County, West Virginia, were held to be entitled to share
equally.
12
II. RELATIVE PRIORITY OF FEDERAL AND STATE TAx LiENs
Questions of priority and of lien for taxes are closely
related and may arise in the same case; however, for the pur-
pose of this article, the question of priority of federal taxes,
not based upon a lien, has been discussed in the preceding
section and the question of priority of federal taxes in so
far as such priority is based upon a lien will be covered in
this section.
As in the case of priority of federal tax claims, federal
tax liens are statutory. The statute imposing a lien for fed-
eral taxes generally is set forth in Section 3670 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code.13 In addition to this lien imposed for
federal taxes generally, special liens are provided for the
federal tax on distilled spirits,14 the federal estate tax,' 5 and
the federal gift tax.' 6
Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code provides:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay
the same after demand, the amount . . . shall be a lien in favor of
the United States upon all property and rights to property, whether
real or personal, belonging to such person.
To create a lien for taxes, under this section, there must
be a previous ascertainment of the sum due by means of an
assessment by the assessor '7 or a demand for payment s
However, after levy has been made, the United States tax
lien relates back to the time when the taxes became due and
payable.'
9
12 Also see It$ re Wyley Co., 292 Fed. 900 (1923) ; In re A. E. Fountain,
Inc., 295 Fed. 873 (1924).
13 53 STAT. 448, 26 U. S. C. A. § 3670.
1426 U. S. C. A. §2800(e).is 26 U. S. C. A. § 827.
16 26 U. S. C. A. § 1009.
'7 United States v. Pacific R. R., 1 Fed. 97, 100 (1800).
IsIn re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Co., 294 Fed. 921 (D. C. Md. 1923),
rev'd on other ground, 5 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 1925).
19 The River Queen, 8 F. (2d) 426 (D. C. Va. 1925).
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On the other hand, many states have statutes declaring
certain taxes to be liens upon the property involved, from
and after a specified date, without any further affirmative
action on the part of the state in reducing the tax account
to a specific figure or enforcing the granted lien by levy.
When the Federal Government subsequently obtains a lien
under Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue Code, a conflict
arises as to which tax takes precedence.
The courts have uniformly held that unless the state lien
is perfected against specific property prior to the attach-
ment of the federal lien, the latter is paramount. Thus,
where a New York franchise tax claim was declared a lien
from the date of assessment, it was held inferior to a federal
lien attaching after such date since the State of New York
had never procured a specific lien by levy.20
In the case of United States 'v. Reese,2 1 a similar situa-
tion arose with respect to the Illinois real estate tax, which
by statute is made a lien on the taxed property from April
first of the year in which the tax was levied. Levies were
Inade in 1930 and 1931, before the federal assessment list had
been received by the collector, but the exact amount to be
paid and secured by the state lien was not determined until
after the lien of the United States arose. The court held
the federal lien superior on the ground that it took prece-
dence over an existing inchoate lien, not liquidated or fixed
in amount until after the federal tax lien had attached.
Thus, the problem of relative priority of liens requires
a determination as to which lien has been perfected or made
specific first, for as illustrated above, a lien of an inchoate
or unperfected character will not be given preference over a
perfected lien even though the latter may have been created
subsequently. However, this general rule is subject to an
important exception, in the case of the federal estate tax
lien, which will be considered in the next section.
20 Gerson, Beesley & Hampton, Inc. v. Shubert Theatre Corp. et al., 7 F.
Supp. 399 (1934).
21 131 F. (2d) 466 (1942).
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III. RELATIVE PilOEFY oF UNmCORDED FEDMAL TAX
LIENS AND RECORDED MORTGAGES,
Before 1913, a federal tax lien was valid as against sub-
sequent purchasers and encumbrances without notice, al-
though no notice of the lien was filed or recorded. Thus, in
United States ,v. Curry,"2 a lien to secure the payment of an
oleomargarine tax for which formal demand had not been
made before the taxpayer's conveyance of property to bona
fide purchasers was held valid as against such purchasers,
the court saying:
When the requirements of the assessment and the demand have'
been complied with, the lien of the government is superior to that
of anyone acquiring any interests in the property after the date of
demand. The government's lien is unaffected by the fact that a sub-
sequent encumbrancer or purchaser became such without knowledge
that the government had any interest in the property or claim upon it.
This harsh rule was modified in 1913 23 by a provision
similar to that presently in effect in the form of Section 3672
of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides:
Validity against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, and judgment
creditors.-(a) Invalidity of lien without notice.-Such lien shall not
be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment
creditor until notice thereof has been filed by the collector ....
As a result of this revision, a mortgage or other lien
which attaches to property of the taxpayer before filing of
notice is now rightly held entitled to priority over the tax
lien. Thus, in Ormsbee v. United States,-24 the lien of a mort-
gage was held superior to a lien for federal income tax,
where the mortgage was properly recorded prior to the filing
of notice of the tax lien. And in Ferris v. Chic-Mint (Gm
Co.,25 where notice of a lien of the United States for taxes
was never filed as required by statute, such tax lien was held
to be inferior to the lien of a recorded mortgage, in respect
of taxes for which an assessment list was received by the
22 201 Fed. 371 (1912).
23 Act of March 4, 1913, Rev. Stat. § 3186.
2423 F. (2d) 926 (1928).
25 14 Del. Ch. 232, 124 A. 577, retrial in 14 Del. Ch. 270, 125 A. 343 (1924).
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collector both before and after the recording of the mortgage,
although the mortgage was given for an antecedent debt.
Unfortunately, however, the courts have restricted this
revision, requiring the filing of federal tax liens, to the gen-
eral liens created in Section 3670 of the Internal Revenue
Code and have not seen fit to extend this line of reasoning
to the special lien provided for the federal estate tax.
As a result, the former harsh rule, which existed with
respect to the general lien, still exists with respect to the
ifederal estate tax lien, Section 827 of the Internal Revenue
Code, which provides as follows:
Lien for tax.
(a) Upon gross estate. Unless the tax is sooner paid in full,
it shall be a lien for ten years upon the gross estate of the
decedent ....
(b) Liability of transferee, etc. If the tax herein imposed is not
paid when due, then the . . . transferee . . . who receives, or has
on the date of the decedent's death, property included in the gross
estate . . . . to the extent of the value, at the time of decedents
death, of such property, shall be personally liable for such tax. Any
part of such property sold by such . . . transferee . . . to a bona
fide purchaser for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth shall be divested of the lien provided in section 827(a)
and a like lien shall then attach to all the property of such . . .
transferee . . . except any part sold to a bona fide purchaser for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth.
Detroit Bacdk v. United States -2 is the leading recent
United States Supreme Court case interpreting the provi-
sions of Section 827. The question there presented was
whether the federal estate tax lien is required to be recorded
in order to give it superiority over the lien of a mortgagee
who acquired his mortgage in good faith without knowledge
of the tax lien.
The Government brought the suit to foreclose an assert-
ed lien for estate taxes assessed upon certain parcels of real
estate. The real estate had been owned at the time of his
death by the decedent and his wife as tenants by the entirety.
Following his death the real estate was not included as part
281317 U. S. 329, 63 Sup. Ct. 297, 87 L. ed. 304 (1943).
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of his estate in computing the federal estate tax. Prior to
assessment or payment of the tax, the parcels of real estate
in question were mortgaged by his children to petitioner
(Detroit Bank) who acted without notice of the Govern-
ment's asserted lien or claim for taxes.
The Supreme Court reviewed the provisions of Section
827 with respect to the estate tax lien and distinguished be-
tween its effect on transfers made inter vivos in contempla-
tion of death and transfers made after the decedent's death
(note the similarity of this distinction and that made by the
court in the case of Section 3466 of the Revised Statutes,
supra). As to the former, no lien attaches against innocent
purchasers of property which a decedent has transferred
inter 'ivos in contemplation of death. As to the latter, how-
ever, the estate tax lien attaches as of the date of decedent's
death as against all persons, including innocent purchasers
and mortgagees. Furthermore, inasmuch as Section 827
makes no reference to any requirement for recording notice
of the lien, no recording is necessary.
In view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court decided
that the Government's estate tax lien, though unrecorded,
was superior to the lien of the mortgagee despite the fact
that the latter had acquired his mortgage in good faith, for
full value, and without knowledge of the tax lien.
As a result of this decision, unless the Government has
expressly released the property from the estate tax lien (as
it may if the individual ease warrants), it is now essential
to exercise extraordinary care in all cases of mortgage,
pledge or sale, whenever it appears that the property in ques-
tion was includible in a decedent's estate within the preced-
ing ten years.
Thus, at present we have a situation with respect to the
estate tax lien which is similar to that which existed prior
to 1913 with respect to the general tax lien. A revision of
the present estate tax lien statute, Section 827, to conform
to the current provisions of Section 3672 is, therefore, highly
desirable in order to guard the innocent purchaser or mort-
gagee of property against the menace of unrecorded federal
estate tax liens.
RAPHAEL J. MUSIOUS.
